Belief Revision and Rational Inference

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dc.creatorFreund, Michael
dc.creatorLehmann, Daniel
dc.date2002-04-14
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-26T00:01:04Z
dc.descriptionThe (extended) AGM postulates for belief revision seem to deal with the revision of a given theory K by an arbitrary formula, but not to constrain the revisions of two different theories by the same formula. A new postulate is proposed and compared with other similar postulates that have been proposed in the literature. The AGM revisions that satisfy this new postulate stand in one-to-one correspondence with the rational, consistency-preserving relations. This correspondence is described explicitly. Two viewpoints on iterative revisions are distinguished and discussed.
dc.description25 pages
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0204032
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0204032
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.dare.co.zw/handle/123456789/103372
dc.subjectArtificial Intelligence
dc.subjectI.2.3
dc.titleBelief Revision and Rational Inference
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