Long-run behavior of games with many players
Abstract
Description
We discuss similarities and differencies between systems of many interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. We analyze long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting agents in spatial and adaptive population games. We review results concerning the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash equilibria. In particular, we present examples of games in which when the number of players or the noise level increases, a population undergoes a transition between its equilibria.
21 pages, to appear in Markov Processes and Related Fields, in Proceedings of the workshop "Inhomogeneous random systems, interacting particle systems, new trends with applications to biology and economy" Paris, January 28 (2004)
21 pages, to appear in Markov Processes and Related Fields, in Proceedings of the workshop "Inhomogeneous random systems, interacting particle systems, new trends with applications to biology and economy" Paris, January 28 (2004)